Given a set of -place relations in the same space and a set of projections from to the associated subspaces, do the projections afford sufficient data to tell the different relations apart? Projective reducibility of triadic relations Main article:
Homework Helper Gold Member I'm very puzzled here by your comment, especially the one that you made in the very beginning in which you don't think the points that I made regarding emergent phenomena has anything to do with "reducibility" or not.
In fact, Bedau uses as an example, micelles, just as Laughlin does, to discuss emergence: Macro entities and micro entities each have various kinds of properties.
Some of the kinds of properties that characterize a macro entity can also apply to its micro constituents; others cannot. For example, consider microcelles. Those polymers are themselves composed out of hydro-phyllic and —phobic monomers. In this context, the micelles are macro objects, while the individual monomeric molecules are micro objects.
The micelles and the monomers both have certain kinds of physical properties in common having a location, mass, etc. By contrast, some of the properties of micelles such as their permeability are the kind of properties that monomers simply cannot possess.
The only point I make here is that the intent of Bedau and others is to define emergence and give examples, and not simply create logical arguments without application to the real world. We are then left with weak and strong emergence.
Weak emergence applies in contexts in which there is a system, call it S, composed out of "micro-level" parts; the number and identity of these parts might change over time.
S has various "macro-level" states macrostates and various "micro-level" states microstates. S's microstates are the intrinsic states of its parts and it's macrostates are structural properties constituted wholly out of microstates.
Interesting macrostates typically average over microstates and so compresses microstate information. Further, there is a microdynamic, call it D, which governs the time evolution of S's microstates.
One could interpret this definition as the macrostates reduce to the individual microstates, but that is not all Bedau has in mind here.
He says, However, weak emergence postulates just complicated mechanism with context-sensitive micro-level interactions. Rather than rejecting reduction, it [weak emergence] requires ontological and causal reduction, for these are what make derivation by simulation possible.
Weak emergence also applies directly to natural systems, whether or not anyone constructs a model or simulation of them. A derivation by simulation involves the temporal iteration of the spatial aggregation of local causal interactions among micro elements.
That is, it involves the local causal processes by which micro interactions give rise to macro phenomena. The notion clearly applies to natural systems as well as computer models. Weakly emergent phenomena are reducible, in principal.COARSE REDUCIBILITY AND ALGORITHMIC RANDOMNESS DENIS R.
HIRSCHFELDT, CARL G. JOCKUSCH, JR., RUTGER KUYPER, AND PAUL E. SCHUPP Abstract. A coarse description of a set A ⊆ ω is a set D ⊆ ω.
In Section 4 I will point out certain persistent internal tensions in Kim's philosophical position on the mind-body problem, tensions that emerge especially clearly against the backdrop of Section 3's comparative discussion of Kim's position relative to various competing positions. On Arnold's analysis, the content, or what is represented, has no role to play in the causal continuum that is essentially reducible to representations and the awareness of them.
Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind. In practice, however, apposite discussion of a particular application typically settles on either one of two different notions of reducibility as capturing the pertinent issues, namely: Reduction under composition.
On the other hand, I presuppose the following three claims: mental types have defining properties that are phenomenal; if a mental type is reducible to a physical type, then it also has a defining property that is physical; and if a mental type is not reducible to a physical .
Because the additive property is shown in the mind, the mind cannot be physically reduced in terms of relationships of cause and effects. Keywords:Additive Property; Reducibility; Causality; Neuron; Mind Body.
1. Introduction. Whether the mind is physically reducible or not is a topic that is still controversial.